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Abstract In this work, we propose and develop a new discrete-event based actuator
attack model on the closed-loop system formed by the plant and the supervisor. We
assume the actuator attacker partially observes the execution of the closed-loop sys-
tem and eavesdrops the control commands issued by the supervisor. The attacker can
modify each control command on a specified subset of attackable events. The attack
principle of the actuator attacker is to remain covert until it can establish a success-
ful attack and lead the attacked closed-loop system into generating certain damaging
strings. We present a characterization for the existence of a successful attacker, via a
new notion of attackability, and prove the existence of the supremal successful actua-
tor attacker, when both the supervisor and the attacker are normal (that is, unobserv-
able events to the supervisor cannot be disabled by the supervisor and unobservable
events to the attacker cannot be attacked by the attacker). Finally, we present an algo-
rithm to synthesize the supremal successful attackers that are represented by Moore
automata.
Keywords cyber-physical systems · discrete-event systems · supervisory control ·
actuator attack · partial observation
1 Introduction
Recently, cyber-physical systems have drawn much research interest within the discrete-
event systems and formal methods community [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Due to
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2the prevalence of cyber-physical systems in modern society and the catastrophic con-
sequences that could occur after these systems get attacked [8], [9], it is important to
design resilient control mechanisms against adversarial attacks; the first step towards
this goal is to understand when adversarial attacks can succeed.
In this work, we focus on discrete-event systems as our model of cyber-physical
systems and consider those adversaries that use actuator attacks. Most of the existing
works in the discrete-event framework consider the problem of deception attack in-
stead [2], [3], [6], where the attacker would accomplish the attack goal by altering the
sensor readings. The work that is most closely related to ours is [1], in which the au-
thors present an actuator enablement attack scenario. For actuator enablement attack
(AE attack), the attacker’s goal is to drive the plant into an unsafe state by overwrit-
ing the supervisor’s disablement actions on some attackable events with enablement
actions. Our work is mainly inspired by [1]; here we present some interesting general-
izations and enhancements over the setup presented in [1], which allows us to model
a more powerful actuator attacker and consider a richer set of defense strategies. The
main contributions of this work are as follows:
1. We present a formal formulation of the supervisor (augmented with a monitoring
mechanism), attacker, attacked closed-loop system and the attack goal. Compared
with [1], the attacker is not restricted to having the same observation scope as the
supervisor. Furthermore, the attacker eavesdrops the control commands issued by
the supervisor, which could be used to refine the knowledge of the attacker about
the string generated by the plant. The actuator attack mechanism does not have to
be AE attacks. The attacker may need to disable some enabled attackable events
to fulfill the attack goal; indeed, in many cases, this is the only way to accomplish
the attack goal due to partial observation by the attacker.
2. We then present a characterization for the existence of a successful attacker against
a normal supervisor, under a normality assumption that all the attackable events
are observable to the attacker; a notion of attackability plays an important role in
the characterization. After that, we prove the existence of the supremal successful
attacker and then present a characterization of it.
3. We also provide an algorithm for the synthesis of the supremal successful attack-
ers that are represented by Moore automata.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the preliminaries. Then,
in Section 3, we shall provide a detailed explanation about the system setup, including
the supervisor (augmented with a monitoring mechanism), attacker, attacked closed-
loop system and the attack goal. In Section 4, we present the characterization results,
together with a synthesis algorithm for synthesizing the supremal successful attackers
on normal supervisors, under the assumption that attackable events are observable to
the attackers. Finally, discussions and conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
We assume the reader is familiar with the basics of supervisory control theory [10], [11]
and automata theory [12]. In this section, we shall recall the basic notions and termi-
nology that are necessary to understand this work.
3A finite state automaton is a 4-tuple G = (Q,Σ ,δ ,q0), where Q is the finite set of
states, Σ the alphabet of events, δ : Q×Σ →Q the partial transition function1, q0 ∈Q
the initial state. A control constraint over Σ is a tuple (Σc,Σo) of sub-alphabets of Σ ,
where Σo ⊆ Σ denotes the set of observable events and Σc ⊆ Σ the set of controllable
events. Let Σuo := Σ −Σo denote the set of unobservable events and Σuc := Σ −Σc
the set of uncontrollable events. For each sub-alphabet Σ ′ ⊆ Σ , the natural projection
P : Σ ∗→ Σ ′∗ is defined and naturally extended to a mapping between languages [10].
Let L(G) = {s ∈ Σ ∗ | δ (q0,s)!} denote the closed-behavior of G. A supervisor on G
w.r.t. control constraint (Σc,Σo) is a map V : Po(L(G))→Γ , where Po :Σ ∗→Σ ∗o is the
natural projection and Γ := {γ ⊆ Σ | Σuc ⊆ γ}. V (w) is the control command issued
by the supervisor after observing w ∈ Po(L(G)). V/G denotes the closed-loop system
of G under the supervision of V . The closed-behavior L(V/G) of V/G is inductively
defined as follows:
1. ε ∈ L(V/G),
2. if s ∈ L(V/G), σ ∈V (Po(s)) and sσ ∈ L(G), then sσ ∈ L(V/G),
3. no other strings belong to L(V/G).
For any two strings s, t ∈Σ ∗, we write s≤ t (respectively, s< t) to denote that s is a
prefix (respectively, strict prefix) of t. For any language L⊆Σ ∗, L is used to denote the
prefix-closure of L. For two finite state automata G1,G2, we write G1‖G2 to denote
their synchronous product. For any string s, we write |s| to denote the length of s. For
convenience, we often identify a singleton with the unique element it contains.
3 System Setup
In this section, we shall introduce the system setup that will be followed in this work.
Intuitive explanations about the attack architecture and assumptions are provided in
Section 3.1. After that, a formal setup is provided in Section 3.2, which includes a
formalization of the supervisor (augmented with a monitoring mechanism), attacker,
attacked closed-loop system and the attack goal.
3.1 Basic Ideas
Let us consider the architecture for actuator attack that is shown in Fig. 1. The plant G,
which is a finite state automaton over Σ , is under the control of a (partially observing)
supervisor V w.r.t. (Σc,Σo), which is also given by a finite state automaton over Σ . In
addition, we assume the existence of an actuator attacker A that is able to modify the
control command γ issued by the supervisor on a designated set of attackable events
Σc,A ⊆ Σc, each time when it intercepts a control command2. The plant G follows the
1 As usual, δ is naturally extended to the partial transition function δ : Q×Σ∗→ Q. We write δ (q,s)!
to mean that string s is defined at state q. For any Q′ ⊆ Q,L⊆ Σ∗, we let δ (Q′,L) = {δ (q,s) | q ∈ Q′,s ∈
L,δ (q,s)!}. We also view δ ⊆ Q×Σ∗×Q as a transition relation.
2 However, the attacker is not allowed to delete existing control commands or insert new control com-
mands. The attacker cannot attack those events outside Σc,A; thus, by allowing the attacker to delete existing
control commands or insert new control commands, the attacker will not be made more powerful.
4modified control command γ ′ instead of γ . We assume the supervisor is augmented
with a monitoring mechanism that monitors the execution of the closed-loop system
(under attack)3. If σ ∈ Σc,A is enabled by the supervisor in γ , then the attacker is not
discovered4 by the supervisor when it disables σ in γ ′; on the other hand, if σ ∈ Σc,A
is disabled in γ , then the decision of enabling σ in γ ′ would place the attacker in the
risk of being discovered immediately by the supervisor if σ can be fired5, unless σ is
unobservable to the supervisor.
Fig. 1: The architecture for actuator attack
We assume that the attacker has a complete knowledge about the models of the
plant G and the supervisor V (and its realization S using a finite state automaton),
including the control constraint (Σc,Σo) over Σ . The attacker A partially observes the
execution of the closed-loop system and (at the same time) eavesdrops the sequence
of control commands issued by the supervisor. We assume that the set Σo,A of events
observable to the attacker is a subset of the set Σo of events observable to the super-
visor. In other words, we assume that the attacker cannot deploy additional sensors
than those that are available to the supervisor. Thus, the supervisor may have a bet-
ter knowledge about the execution of the closed-loop system than the attacker does.
The sequence of control commands (issued by the supervisor) encodes to a certain
extent the supervisor’s knowledge on the execution of the closed-loop system, which
could be used by the attacker to better estimate the string generated by the plant and
determine whether it shall establish an attack on some attackable events. We assume
that each time when the supervisor observes an event (and makes a state transition), it
issues a new control command that can be intercepted by the attacker. By observing
a control command from the supervisor, the attacker concludes that an observable
event σ of the supervisor has occurred even if σ may be unobservable to the attacker.
3 As we shall see in Section 3.2.1, the monitoring mechanism is embedded into the supervisor V . Thus,
V is not only responsible for controlling the plant but also halting the execution of the closed-loop system
after detecting an actuator attack. For more details, see our formalization of the system setup provided in
Section 3.2.
4 The supervisor is not sure whether σ has been disabled by an attacker, even if disabling σ may result
in deadlock, as the supervisor is never sure whether: 1) deadlock has occurred due to actuator attack, or 2)
σ will possibly fire soon (according to the internal mechanism of the plant).
5 Once σ is fired, the supervisor immediately knows that an actuator attack has occurred if σ is observ-
able to the supervisor, since σ is supposed to have been disabled. σ can be fired only if it is enabled by the
plant.
5The goal of the attacker is to drive the attacked closed-loop system into executing
certain damaging strings outside the controlled behavior. The supervisor has a mecha-
nism for halting the execution of the closed-loop system after discovering an actuator
attack. Thus, in order to attack the closed-loop system successfully, the attacker must
remain covert6 [2] and enable some disabled (attackable) events only when either 1)
the attack will not be discovered by the supervisor, i.e., the attacker remains covert,
or 2) if the attack is discovered by the supervisor, then a damaging string has been
generated. In particular, if σ ∈ Σc,A is disabled by the supervisor in γ , then enabling
σ in γ ′ will not place the attacker in the risk of being discovered by the supervisor if
1) σ is unobservable to the supervisor, or 2) if σ is not enabled by the plant and thus
cannot be fired.
3.2 Formal Setup
In this section, we explain the formal setup that is used in this work. In Section 3.2.1,
we provide a formal definition of a supervisor, which is augmented with a monitoring
mechanism that will halt the execution of the (attacked) closed-loop system once an
actuator attack is discovered. In Section 3.2.2, we consider an actuator attacker that
is able to partially observe the execution of the closed-loop system and (at the same
time) eavesdrop the control commands issued by the supervisor. In Section 3.2.3, we
then introduce the notion of a damage-inflicting set and explain the attacked closed-
loop system formed by the plant, supervisor and actuator attacker. Then, we present
a formulation of the goal of the actuator attacker.
3.2.1 Supervisor
We recall that a supervisor on G w.r.t. (Σc,Σo) is a map V : Po(L(G))→Γ , where Γ =
{γ ⊆ Σ | Σuc ⊆ γ}. Since Po(L(G)) = (Po(L(G))−Po(L(V/G)))∪˙Po(L(V/G)) and
only those strings in Po(L(V/G)) can be observed by the supervisor in the normal ex-
ecution of the closed-loop system, the standard definition of a supervisor requires that
the supervisor shall also apply control for those strings w ∈ Po(L(G))−Po(L(V/G))
that cannot be observed in the normal execution of the closed-loop system. From the
point of view of the supervisor, it will conclude the existence of an (actuator) attacker
and then halt the execution of the closed-loop system the first time when it observes
some string w /∈ Po(L(V/G)). Under this interpretation, the supervisor is augmented
with a monitoring mechanism for the detection of actuator attack and does not control
outside Po(L(V/G)); thus, the supervisor (augmented with a monitoring mechanism)
is effectively7 a map V : Po(L(V/G))→ Γ .
6 The attacker is covert if the supervisor is not sure whether an attack has occurred.
7 To explicitly model the monitoring mechanism, we could pad the domain of V to Po(L(G)) by setting
V (w) =‘halt’ for any w ∈ Po(L(G))−Po(L(V/G)), where ‘halt’ is a special control symbol that immedi-
ately halts the execution of the closed-loop system. This view will be implicitly adopted in the rest.
63.2.2 Actuator Attacker
In this section, we shall present a formal definition of an actuator attacker. To that end,
we need to model the partial observation capability of an attacker, taking into account
of the fact that control commands issued by the supervisor can be eavesdropped.
We here note that an actuator attacker may be able to attack the closed-loop sys-
tem only if the supervisor has not halted the execution (of the closed-loop system);
suppose s is the string that is generated by the plant, then the attacker may be able to
attack the closed-loop system only if Po(s)∈Po(L(V/G)) (see Section 3.2.1). It is im-
portant to understand the observation sequence for the attacker when s is generated,
which is the only factor that determines the attack decision of the attacker. If the plant
executes any event σ ∈ Σuo that is unobservable to the supervisor, then the attacker
will observe nothing since σ is unobservable to the attacker (no observation of execu-
tion from the plant) and σ is unobservable to the supervisor (no control command will
be issued by the supervisor). Thus, the attacker’s observation sequence solely depends
on the supervisor’s observation sequence Po(s) ∈ Po(L(V/G)). Now, we still need to
define a function PˆVo,A that maps supervisor’s observation sequences to attacker’s ob-
servation sequences. Let Po(s) = σ1σ2 . . .σn denote the supervisor’s observation se-
quence. We shall explain how it can be transformed into the attacker’s observation se-
quence. If the supervisor observes the execution of event σi ∈ Σo, then the supervisor
will issue a new control command V (σ1σ2 . . .σi), since σi is observable to the super-
visor, which is then intercepted by the attacker. There are two subcases for σi ∈ Σo,
regarding the attacker’s observation on the execution of the plant. If σi ∈ Σo,A ⊆ Σo,
then the attacker will also observe execution of σi from the plant. If σi ∈ Σo−Σo,A,
then the attacker will observe nothing (that is, ε) from the plant; however, based on
the newly issued control command, it can infer that some event in Σo−Σo,A has al-
ready been fired. Thus, at each step, the attacker observes (Po,A(σi),V (σ1σ2 . . .σi)).
Then, the attacker’s observation sequence is simply a string in ((Σo,A ∪{ε})×Γ )∗.
From the above discussion, we obtain that PˆVo,A : Po(L(V/G))→ ((Σo,A∪{ε})×Γ )∗
is a function that maps supervisor’s observation sequences to attacker’s observation
sequences, where, for any w = σ1σ2 . . .σn ∈ Po(L(V/G)), PˆVo,A(w) is defined to be
(Po,A(σ1),V (σ1))(Po,A(σ2),V (σ1σ2)) . . .(Po,A(σn),V (σ1σ2 . . .σn)) ∈
((Σo,A∪{ε})×Γ )∗.
The set of all the possible observation sequences8 for the attacker is PˆVo,A(Po(L(V/G))).
The attacker modifies the control command it intercepts based upon its observation.
We shall call the tuple (Σc,A,Σo,A) an attack constraint over Σ . An attacker on (G,V )
w.r.t. attack constraint (Σc,A,Σo,A) is a function A : PˆVo,A(Po(L(V/G)))→ ∆Γ , where
∆Γ = 2Σc,A . Here, ∆Γ denotes the set of all the possible attack decisions that can be
made by the attacker on the set Σc,A of attackable events. Intuitively, each ∆γ ∈ ∆Γ
denotes the set of enabled attackable events that are determined by the attacker. For
any Po(s) ∈ Po(L(V/G)), the attacker determines the set ∆γ = A(PˆVo,A(Po(s))) of at-
tackable events to be enabled based on its observation PˆVo,A(Po(s)). We notice that the
8 The execution of the attacked closed-loop system will be halted once w /∈ Po(L(V/G)) is observed by
the supervisor, at which point the attacker will not (need to) record any further observation sequence.
7set of attackable events enabled by the supervisor in γ is V (Po(s))∩Σc,A. Thus, the
attacker applies actual attack iff V (Po(s))∩Σc,A 6= A(PˆVo,A(Po(s))).
3.2.3 Attacked Closed-loop System and Damage-Inflicting Set
Based on the above formal definitions of a supervisor and an actuator attacker, we are
ready to define the attacked closed-loop system formed by the plant, supervisor and
attacker.
We already know that, after string s is generated in the plant with Po(s)∈Po(L(V/G)),
the control command issued by the supervisor is γ =V (Po(s)) and the attack decision
made by the actuator attacker is ∆γ = A(PˆVo,A(Po(s))). Then, it follows that the mod-
ified control command is γ ′ := (γ−Σc,A)∪∆γ = (V (Po(s))−Σc,A)∪A(PˆVo,A(Po(s))).
Now, given the supervisor V and the actuator attacker A, we could lump them together
into an equivalent (attacked) supervisor VA : Po(L(V/G))→Γ such that, for any string
w∈ Po(L(V/G)) observed by the attacked supervisor, the control command issued by
VA is VA(w) = (V (w)−Σc,A)∪A(PˆVo,A(w)). The plant G follows the control command
issued by the attacked supervisor VA and the attacked closed-loop system is denoted
by VA/G (the grouping of supervisor V and attacker A into VA is illustrated in Fig. 2).
In the presence of an actuator attacker performing actuator attacks, the execution of
the closed-loop system will be immediately halted once the supervisor detects an at-
tack from the actuator attacker. Thus, the definition of the (attacked) closed-behavior
L(VA/G) of VA/G is slightly different from that of L(V/G) (due to the existence of
the monitoring mechanism) and is inductively defined as follows:
1. ε ∈ L(VA/G),
2. if s ∈ L(VA/G), Po(s) ∈ Po(L(V/G)), σ ∈ VA(Po(s)) and sσ ∈ L(G), then sσ ∈
L(VA/G),
3. no other strings belong to L(VA/G).
We notice that sσ ∈L(VA/G)) only if Po(s)∈Po(L(V/G)). That is, if Po(s) /∈Po(L(V/G)),
the supervisor already halts the execution of the closed-loop system and thus sσ can-
not be generated. The goal of the actuator attacker is to drive the attacked closed-loop
system into executing certain damaging strings. Let Ldmg⊆ L(G) be some regular lan-
guage over Σ that denotes a so-called “damage-inflicting set”, where each string is a
damaging string. We here shall require that Ldmg∩L(V/G) =∅, that is, no string in
L(V/G) could be damaging. Then, we have that Ldmg ⊆ L(G)−L(V/G). The goal of
the actuator attacker is formulated as follows:
1. L(VA/G)∩Ldmg 6=∅, and
2. L(VA/G)−P−1o Po(L(V/G))⊆ LdmgΣ ∗.
The first condition says that the actuator attacker can drive the system into executing
certain damaging strings. It is a “possibilistic” statement in the sense that it is possible
for a damaging string to be generated by the attacked closed-loop system. However,
there is no guarantee that a damaging string will be generated in any single run of the
attacked closed-loop system, due to potential uncontrollable factors that are beyond
the capability of the attacker. The second condition says that once the attacked closed-
loop system runs outside P−1o Po(L(V/G)), i.e., Po(s) /∈Po(L(V/G), at which point the
8supervisor detects the actuator attack and halts the execution of the attacked closed-
loop system, a damaging string must have been generated9, i.e. some prefix of s is a
damaging string. If the actuator attacker achieves its goal, then it is considered to be
successful. Thus, we say an attacker A is successful on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and
Ldmg if
1. L(VA/G)∩Ldmg 6=∅, and
2. L(VA/G)−P−1o Po(L(V/G))⊆ LdmgΣ ∗.
A supervisor V is said to be resilient (against actuator attack) on G w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A)
and Ldmg if there is no successful actuator attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and
Ldmg. It is of interest to consider the following two basic problems:
1. Given a plant G over Σ , a supervisor V on G w.r.t. control constraint (Σc,Σo), an
attack constraint (Σc,A,Σo,A) over Σ and a damage-inflicting set Ldmg ⊆ Σ ∗, does
there exist a successful attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg?
2. Given a plant G over Σ , a control constraint (Σc,Σo) over Σ , a specification E ⊆
Σ ∗, an attack constraint (Σc,A,Σo,A) over Σ and a damage-inflicting set Ldmg⊆Σ ∗,
does there exist a supervisor V on G w.r.t. (Σc,Σo) such that 1) L(V/G)⊆ E and
2) there is no successful attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg?
In the rest of this work, we shall present a solution to Problem 1 under the simplifying
assumption of normality; Problem 2 will be left as future work.
Fig. 2: The equivalent attacked supervisor VA
4 Attack Synthesis for Normal Supervisors
A supervisor V : Po(L(V/G))→Γ is said to be normal if it is w.r.t. a control constraint
(Σc,Σo), where Σc⊆ Σo. Then, we have that Σuo⊆ Σuc, that is, unobservable events to
the supervisor cannot be disabled by the supervisor. Thus, for any w ∈ Po(L(V/G)),
we have V (w)⊇ Σuc ⊇ Σuo by the definition of Γ . A supervisor V (on G) w.r.t. control
9 That is, the attacker is only detected when it is too late.
9constraint (Σc,Σo) is realized by a finite state automaton S =(X ,Σ ,ζ ,x0) that satisfies
the controllability and observability constraints10 [13]:
1. (controllability) for any state x∈X and any uncontrollable event σ ∈Σuc, ζ (x,σ)!,
2. (observability) for any state x ∈ X and any unobservable event σ ∈ Σuo, ζ (x,σ)!
implies ζ (x,σ) = x,
where we have L(V/G)=L(S‖G) and, for any s∈L(G) such that Po(s)∈Po(L(V/G)),
V (Po(s)) = {σ ∈ Σ | ζ (ζ (x0,s′),σ)!,s′ ∈ L(S)∩P−1o Po(s)}. For a normal supervisor
S w.r.t. control constraint (Σc,Σo), the observability constraint is then reduced to: for
any state x ∈ X and any unobservable event σ ∈ Σuo, ζ (x,σ) = x.
In this section, we investigate the actuator attacker’s attack strategy when the su-
pervisors satisfy the normality property. Normal supervisors leave much reduced at-
tack surfaces for the attacker, since events that are disabled must be observable to the
supervisor and enabling those disabled (attackable) events (by the actuator attacker)
may immediately break the covertness of the attacker, if they are also enabled by the
plant. In other words, once the plant generates any string s /∈ L(V/G), which is only
possible after the attacker enables a disabled attackable event, the supervisor will im-
mediately halt the execution of the closed-loop system. Based on this observation, we
shall now show that, with the normality assumption imposed on the supervisors, the
definition of L(VA/G) can be simplified.
Lemma 1 If V is normal on G w.r.t. (Σc,Σo), then L(VA/G) is inductively defined as
follows:
1. ε ∈ L(VA/G),
2. if s ∈ L(VA/G), s ∈ L(V/G), σ ∈VA(Po(s)) and sσ ∈ L(G), then sσ ∈ L(VA/G),
3. no other strings belong to L(VA/G).
Proof. This follows from L(G)∩P−1o Po(L(V/G)) = L(V/G) for supervisors that sat-
isfy the normality condition [10].
Moreover, the goal of the attacker can also be simplified when V is assumed to be
normal.
Lemma 2 If V is normal on G w.r.t. (Σc,Σo), then,
1. L(VA/G)∩Ldmg 6=∅, and
2. L(VA/G)−P−1o Po(L(V/G))⊆ LdmgΣ ∗
iff ∅ 6= L(VA/G)−L(V/G)⊆ Ldmg.
Proof. Since V is normal, we have L(G)∩P−1o Po(L(V/G))=L(V/G). Thus, L(VA/G)−
L(V/G) = L(VA/G)− (L(G)∩P−1o Po(L(V/G))) = L(VA/G)−P−1o Po(L(V/G)). It is
clear that the right hand side (of the “iff” statement) implies the left hand side (of the
“iff” statement). In the following, we only need to show that the left hand side implies
the right hand side. Suppose the left hand side holds. That is, we have
10 There are different realizations of the same map V . We focus on a canonical form of a supervisor pro-
posed in [13]; other realizations of V can be used with no essential difference, apart from the consideration
of technical convenience.
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1. L(VA/G)∩Ldmg 6=∅, and
2. L(VA/G)−L(V/G) ⊆ LdmgΣ ∗ (since L(VA/G)−P−1o Po(L(V/G)) = L(VA/G)−
L(V/G)).
Then, by 1), we know that there exists some string s ∈ L(VA/G)∩Ldmg. Since Ldmg∩
L(V/G) =∅, we then have that s /∈ L(V/G). Thus, we conclude that s ∈ L(VA/G)−
L(V/G) and∅ 6= L(VA/G)−L(V/G). Now, let s be any string in L(VA/G)−L(V/G).
By the definition of L(VA/G) and Lemma 1, we know11 that s = s′σ for some s′ ∈
L(V/G). Since s′ ∈ L(V/G), we have s′∩Ldmg =∅. Since s′σ = s∈ LdmgΣ ∗ by 2), we
have that s′σ ∩Ldmg 6=∅. The only possibility is that s = s′σ ∈ Ldmg. Thus, we have
L(VA/G)−L(V/G) ⊆ Ldmg. In conclusion, we have that ∅ 6= L(VA/G)−L(V/G) ⊆
Ldmg.
Remark 1 For a normal supervisor V , by Lemma 2, A is successful on (G,V ) w.r.t.
(Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg iff ∅ 6= L(VA/G)−L(V/G)⊆ Ldmg.
We make the following simplifying assumption throughout the rest of this work.
Assumption 1. Σc,A ⊆ Σo,A holds for the attack constraint (Σc,A,Σo,A).
Remark 2 Intuitively, Assumption 1 states that the attacker cannot attack events that
it cannot observe. With Assumption 1, we then have the following inclusion relations
in the case of attacking normal supervisors.
1. Σc,A ⊆ Σo,A ⊆ Σo
2. Σc,A ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σo.
An attacker A is said to be normal if it is w.r.t. an attack constraint (Σc,A,Σo,A),
where Σc,A ⊆ Σo,A. Thus, in this work we consider the special case of normal supervi-
sors and normal attackers. We shall now introduce the notion of an enabling actuator
attacker, which plays an important role in solving the problem of synthesizing attack-
ers in this setup (see Remark 2).
Definition 1 An attacker A on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) is said to be an enabling at-
tacker if A(PˆVo,A(w))⊇V (w)∩Σc,A, for any w ∈ Po(L(V/G)).
For an enabling actuator attacker A, we have that VA(w)= (V (w)−Σc,A)∪A(PˆVo,A(w))⊇
V (w), for any w∈ Po(L(V/G)). Intuitively, it never disables attackable events that are
enabled by the supervisor, that is, the only attack decision of an enabling attacker is to
enable attackable events that are disabled by the supervisor. Essentially, an enabling
actuator attacker only performs AE attacks [1]. It follows that, for any enabling actu-
ator attacker A, we have L(VA/G)⊇ L(V/G). We are now ready to state the following
theorem; it states that, with the normality assumption imposed on the supervisors and
attackers, we only need to focus on AE attacks in order to determine the existence of
successful attackers.
Theorem 1 Let the plant G and the normal supervisor V be given. Then, the follow-
ing three statements are equivalent.
11 s cannot be ε since ε ∈ L(V/G).
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1. There exists a successful attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg.
2. There exists a successful enabling attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg.
3. There exists a string s ∈ L(V/G) and an attackable event σ ∈ Σc,A, such that
(a) sσ ∈ Ldmg
(b) for any s′ ∈ L(V/G), PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s′)) and s′σ ∈ L(G) together im-
plies s′σ ∈ Ldmg.
Proof. Clearly, 2) implies 1). We shall first show 1) implies 3).
Suppose 1) holds. Let A be a successful attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and
Ldmg. By definition, we have ∅ 6= L(VA/G)−L(V/G) ⊆ Ldmg. Let us now fix some
string s0 in L(VA/G)−L(V/G), the existence of which is ensured since L(VA/G)−
L(V/G) 6=∅. It is not difficult to see that s0 = sσ for some s∈ L(V/G)∩L(VA/G) and
σ ∈ A(PˆVo,A(Po(s)))−V (Po(s)) ⊆ Σc,A. Since sσ = s0 ∈ L(VA/G)−L(V/G) ⊆ Ldmg,
we conclude that 3. a) holds. In the following, we shall show that 3. b) also holds.
Let s′ be any string in L(V/G). Suppose that PˆVo,A(Po(s
′)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s)) and s
′σ ∈
L(G). We need to show that s′σ ∈ Ldmg.
It is not difficult to see that PˆVo,A(Po(s
′))= PˆVo,A(Po(s)) implies V (Po(s
′))=V (Po(s)).
Indeed, PˆVo,A(Po(s
′))= PˆVo,A(Po(s)) implies last(Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′)))= last(PˆVo,A(Po(s))), where
last denotes the operation that computes the last element in a string, and by the defi-
nition of PˆVo,A we have
last(PˆVo,A(Po(s
′))) = (Po,A(last(Po(s′))),V (Po(s′))) and
last(PˆVo,A(Po(s))) = (Po,A(last(Po(s))),V (Po(s)))
We shall only need to show that s′ ∈ L(VA/G). Then, it follows that s′σ ∈ L(VA/G)−
L(V/A)⊆Ldmg, since s′σ ∈L(G) and σ ∈A(PˆVo,A(Po(s)))=A(PˆVo,A(Po(s′)))⊆VA(Po(s′))
and σ /∈V (Po(s)) =V (Po(s′)).
Suppose, on the contrary, that s′ /∈ L(VA/G), then it must be the case that s′ =
s′1σ
′s′2 for some s
′
1,s
′
2 ∈ Σ ∗ and σ ′ ∈ Σ such that s′1 ∈ L(V/G)∩L(VA/G) and s′1σ ′ ∈
L(V/G)−L(VA/G). Thus, we have σ ′ ∈V (Po(s′1)) and σ ′ /∈VA(Po(s′1))= (V (Po(s′1))−
Σc,A)∪A(PˆVo,A(Po(s′1))). It follows that σ ′ ∈V (Po(s′1))∩Σc,A−A(PˆVo,A(Po(s′1)))⊆Σc,A.
Then, by Assumption 1, we have σ ′ ∈ Σo,A. It is immediate that PˆVo,A(Po(s′1)) is a strict
prefix of PˆVo,A(Po(s
′)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s)), since s
′
1σ
′ ≤ s′ and σ ′ ∈ Σo,A. It follows that the
set
D = {s1 ∈ Σ ∗ | s1 ≤ s, PˆVo,A(Po(s1)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s′1))}
is non-empty. Let s01 be the longest string in D. Then, Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
0
1)) = Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′
1)) is
a strict prefix of PˆVo,A(Po(s)) and it follows that s 6= s01. Since s01 ≤ s by the definition
of D, we must have s01 < s. It follows that s = s
0
1σ
′′s02 for some σ
′′ ∈ Σ and s02 ∈ Σ ∗.
We first observe that σ ′′ ∈ Σo, since otherwise s01σ ′′ would be another string in D and
it is longer than s01, which contradicts the fact that s
0
1 is the longest string in D. Next,
we show that σ ′′ ∈ Σo,A. Otherwise, we have σ ′′ ∈ Σo−Σo,A and the following.
i) PˆVo,A(Po(s
0
1)) = Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′
1))
ii) PˆVo,A(Po(s
0
1σ
′′)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s
0
1))(ε,V (Po(s
0
1σ
′′)))
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iii) PˆVo,A(Po(s
′
1σ
′)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s1))(σ
′,V (Po(s′1σ
′)))
It follows that PˆVo,A(Po(s
0
1σ
′′)) 6= PˆVo,A(Po(s′1σ ′)) and |PˆVo,A(Po(s01σ ′′))|= |PˆVo,A(Po(s′1σ ′))|.
Since s01σ
′′ is a prefix of s and s′1σ
′ is a prefix of s′, we conclude that PˆVo,A(Po(s
0
1σ
′′)) is
a prefix of PˆVo,A(Po(s)) and Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′
1σ
′)) is a prefix of PˆVo,A(Po(s
′)); then, the prefix of
PˆVo,A(Po(s)) of length |PˆVo,A(Po(s01σ ′′))| is different from the prefix of PˆVo,A(Po(s′)) of the
same length. However, this contradicts the supposition that PˆVo,A(Po(s
′))= PˆVo,A(Po(s)).
That is, we must have σ ′′ ∈ Σo,A. Moreover, we must have σ ′′ = σ ′; otherwise, the
same contradiction can be reached by comparing PˆVo,A(Po(s
0
1σ
′′)) and PˆVo,A(Po(s
′
1σ
′)).
Since PˆVo,A(Po(s
0
1))= Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′
1)), we have that σ
′ /∈A(PˆVo,A(Po(s′1)))=A(PˆVo,A(Po(s01))).
Thus, we have σ ′′ /∈ A(PˆVo,A(Po(s01))) and σ ′′ = σ ′ ∈ Σc,A. Then, we can conclude that
σ ′′ /∈VA(Po(s01)). However, this contradicts with the fact that s01σ ′′ ∈ L(VA/G). Thus,
we conclude that indeed s′ ∈ L(VA/G). It follows that 3. b) holds.
Finally, we shall show that 3) implies 2).
Now, suppose 3) holds. Let s ∈ L(V/G) and σ ∈ Σc,A such that 1) sσ ∈ Ldmg,
and 2) for any string s′ ∈ L(V/G), PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s′)) and s′σ ∈ L(G) together
implies s′σ ∈ Ldmg. It is clear that σ /∈V (Po(s)). Let A : PˆVo,A(Po(L(V/G)))→ ∆Γ be
an attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A), where
1. A(PˆVo,A(Po(s))) = (V (Po(s))∩Σc,A)∪{σ}
2. for any w ∈ Po(L(V/G)) such that PˆVo,A(w) 6= PˆVo,A(Po(s)), A(PˆVo,A(w)) = V (w)∩
Σc,A.
Intuitively, the attacker A performs no actual attack until it observes PˆVo,A(Po(s)), at
which point the attacker enables the disabled attackable event σ . It is immediate
that A is a well-defined actuator attacker, since for any w ∈ Po(L(V/G)) we have that
V (w) is the second component of last(PˆVo,A(w)). That is, for any w1,w2 ∈Po(L(V/G))
such that PˆVo,A(w1)= Pˆ
V
o,A(w2) 6= PˆVo,A(Po(s)), we have that A(PˆVo,A(w1))=A(PˆVo,A(w2)),
since V (w1) =V (w2). It is clear that A is an enabling actuator attacker by definition.
In the rest, we show that ∅ 6= L(VA/G)−L(V/G) ⊆ Ldmg, that is, A is a successful
attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg.
Since A is an enabling attacker, we have L(V/G) ⊆ L(VA/G). Since s ∈ L(V/G)
and σ ∈ A(PˆVo,A(Po(s))) ⊆ VA(Po(s)) and sσ ∈ Ldmg ⊆ L(G), we have sσ ∈ L(VA/G)
and sσ /∈L(V/G), i.e., sσ ∈L(VA/G)−L(V/G). We conclude that L(VA/G)−L(V/G) 6=
∅. In the rest, we only need to show that L(VA/G)−L(V/G) ⊆ Ldmg. Let s′′ be any
string in L(VA/G)−L(V/G). By the definition of L(VA/G) and Lemma 1, we con-
clude that s′′ = s′σ ′ for some s′ ∈ L(V/G) and some σ ′ ∈ Σc,A, where we have σ ′ /∈
V (Po(s′)) and σ ′ ∈ A(PˆVo,A(Po(s′)))⊆VA(Po(s′)). We then conclude that V (Po(s′)) 6=
VA(Po(s′)) and also σ ′ ∈VA(Po(s′))−V (Po(s′)). Now, from the definition of A, we ob-
serve that, for any w∈Po(L(V/G)), VA(w) 6=V (w) only if12 A(PˆVo,A(w)) 6=V (w)∩Σc,A
and PˆVo,A(w) = Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s)) and VA(w) =V (w)∪{σ}.
Thus, we conclude that VA(Po(s′))=V (Po(s′))∪{σ} and PˆVo,A(Po(s′))= PˆVo,A(Po(s));
the only possibility is σ ′=σ . Thus, we have that s′ ∈L(V/G), PˆVo,A(Po(s))= PˆVo,A(Po(s′))
12 VA(w) = (V (w)−Σc,A)∪A(PˆVo,A(w)) 6=V (w) only if A(PˆVo,A(w)) 6=V (w)∩Σc,A.
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and s′σ = s′σ ′ = s′′ ∈ L(G), which implies s′′ = s′σ ∈ Ldmg by the supposition. That
is, we have shown that L(VA/G)−L(V/G)⊆ Ldmg. That is, 2) holds.
Based on Theorem 1, we are able to identify a notion of attackability and a notion
of an attack pair for ensuring the existence of a successful (enabling) attacker, in the
case of normal supervisors.
Definition 2 Let the plant G and the normal supervisor V be given. (G,V ) is said to
be attackable w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg if there exists a string s ∈ L(V/G) and an
attackable event σ ∈ Σc,A, such that
1. sσ ∈ Ldmg
2. for any s′ ∈ L(V/G), PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s′)) and s′σ ∈ L(G) together implies
s′σ ∈ Ldmg.
Moreover, each pair (s,σ) ∈ L(V/G)×Σc,A that satisfies Conditions 1) and 2) is said
to be an attack pair for (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg.
Thus, Theorem 1 states that there exists a successful (enabling) attacker on (G,V )
w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg iff (G,V ) is attackable w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg. Further-
more, based on the proof of Theorem 1, a successful (enabling) attacker A on (G,V )
w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg can be readily synthesized if an attack pair for (G,V ) w.r.t.
(Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg can be obtained. We now make the following remark.
Remark 3 Given any two supervisors V1,V2 on G w.r.t. (Σc,Σo), (G,V1) and (G,V2)
are said to be equi-attackable w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg if (G,V1) is attackable w.r.t.
(Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg iff (G,V2) is attackable w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg. It is worth
noting that L(V1/G) = L(V2/G) does not imply the equi-attackability of (G,V1) and
(G,V2), since in general V1 6=V2 and thus PˆV1o,A 6= PˆV2o,A.
4.1 Characterization of the Supremal Successful Enabling Attacker
From now on, we shall mainly focus on the class of enabling attackers on (G,V ) w.r.t.
(Σc,A,Σo,A). It is of interest to obtain a successful enabling attacker A that generates as
many damaging strings in Ldmg as possible in L(VA/G). Now, let APdmg denote the set
of all the attack pairs for (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg. For any (s,σ) ∈ APdmg,
we define En(s,σ) := {s′σ ∈ L(G) | PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s′)),s′ ∈ L(V/G)}. Intu-
itively, En(s,σ) denotes the set of strings in L(G) that are one-step σ -extensions s′σ
of strings s′ in L(V/G), where s′ and s are attacker observation equivalent strings, i.e.,
PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′)). It is clear that sσ ∈ En(s,σ)⊆ Ldmg holds. We now have
the following characterization of attacked closed-behavior under successful enabling
attackers.
Proposition 1 Let the plant G and the normal supervisor V be given. Suppose APdmg 6=
∅. Then, for any enabling attacker A on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A), A is successful on
(G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg iff L(VA/G) = L(V/G)∪⋃(s,σ)∈B En(s,σ) for some
non-empty B⊆ APdmg.
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Proof. Suppose APdmg 6=∅. Then, we know that (G,V ) is attackable w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A)
and Ldmg. Let A be any enabling attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A). We have L(V/G)⊆
L(VA/G).
Suppose L(VA/G) = L(V/G)∪⋃(s,σ)∈B En(s,σ) for some non-empty B⊆ APdmg.
Let (s0,σ0)∈B⊆APdmg be an arbitrarily chosen attack pair on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A)
and Ldmg, the existence of which is ensured since B is non-empty. We have s0σ0 ∈
Ldmg and s0σ0 ∈En(s0,σ0)⊆ L(VA/G), by the supposition that L(VA/G) = L(V/G)∪⋃
(s,σ)∈B En(s,σ). Thus, s0σ0 ∈ L(VA/G)−L(V/G) and L(VA/G)−L(V/G) 6=∅. We
have L(VA/G) = L(V/G)∪⋃(s,σ)∈B En(s,σ) ⊆ L(V/G)∪ Ldmg. Thus, L(VA/G)−
L(V/G)⊆ Ldmg. Thus, A is successful on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg.
Now, suppose A is successful on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg, that is, ∅ 6=
L(VA/G)−L(V/G)⊆ Ldmg. Let s0 be any string in L(VA/G)−L(V/G). It is clear that
s0 = sσ for some s∈ L(V/G) and σ ∈ Σc,A. From the proof of Theorem 1, (s,σ) is an
attack pair for (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg. Now, Let B = {(s,σ) ∈ L(V/G)×
Σc,A | sσ ∈ L(VA/G)−L(V/G)}. It is clear that ∅ 6= B ⊆ APdmg. We now show that
L(VA/G)− L(V/G) = ⋃(s,σ)∈B En(s,σ). It then follows from L(V/G) ⊆ L(VA/G)
that L(VA/G) = L(V/G)∪⋃(s,σ)∈B En(s,σ).
It is clear that L(VA/G)−L(V/G) ⊆ ⋃(s,σ)∈B En(s,σ), since, for any s0 = sσ ∈
L(VA/G)−L(V/G), we have (s,σ) ∈ B and s0 = sσ ∈ En(s,σ)⊆⋃(s,σ)∈B En(s,σ).
On the other hand, let s0 be any string in
⋃
(s,σ)∈B En(s,σ). By definition, there
exists some (s,σ)∈ B such that s0 ∈ En(s,σ). We have sσ ∈ L(VA/G)−L(V/G) and
s0 = s′σ ∈ L(G) for some s′ ∈ L(V/G) such that PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s′)). It is clear
that σ ∈ A(PˆVo,A(Po(s))) = A(PˆVo,A(Po(s′)))⊆VA(Po(s′)) and thus s0 = s′σ ∈ L(VA/G).
PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′)) implies V (Po(s)) =V (Po(s′)). From σ /∈V (Po(s)), we con-
clude that σ /∈V (Po(s′)) and thus s0 = s′σ /∈ L(V/G). Then, we have s0 ∈ L(VA/G)−
L(V/G). That is,
⋃
(s,σ)∈B En(s,σ)⊆ L(VA/G)−L(V/G).
It follows that the largest possible attacked closed-behavior under successful en-
abling attackers is L(V/G)∪⋃(s,σ)∈APdmg En(s,σ), by Proposition 1, if APdmg is non-
empty. Now, we show that it is realized by the enabling attacker Asup : PˆVo,A(Po(L(V/G)))→
∆Γ such that Asup(PˆVo,A(Po(s)))= (V (Po(s))∩Σc,A)∪I(PˆVo,A(Po(s))), for any s∈L(V/G),
where I(PˆVo,A(Po(s))) := {σ ∈Σc,A | ∃s′ ∈L(V/G), PˆVo,A(Po(s))= PˆVo,A(Po(s′))∧(s′,σ)∈
APdmg}. It is clear that I(PˆVo,A(Po(s)))∩V (Po(s))=∅ by the definition of I(PˆVo,A(Po(s))).
Intuitively, after the closed-loop system generates a string s ∈ L(V/G)⊆ L(VAsup/G),
the attacker Asup enables an attackable event13 σ ∈ Σc,A−V (Po(s)) iff there exists a
string s′ ∈ L(V/G) that is observationally equivalent to s from the attacker’s point of
view, i.e., PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′)), such that (s′,σ) is an attack pair. We first show
that Asup is a well-defined attacker. That is, for any two strings s,s′′ ∈ L(V/G) such
that PˆVo,A(Po(s))= Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′′)), we need to show that Asup(PˆVo,A(Po(s)))=A
sup(PˆVo,A(Po(s
′′))).
Lemma 3 Asup is a well-defined attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A).
13 The attackable events in V (Po(s))∩Σc,A are always enabled by Asup since Asup is enabling.
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Proof. Since PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′′)) implies that V (Po(s)) = V (Po(s′′)), we only
need to show that I(PˆVo,A(Po(s)))= I(Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′′))). This is straightforward from PˆVo,A(Po(s))=
PˆVo,A(Po(s
′′)) and the definitions of I(PˆVo,A(Po(s))), I(Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′′))).
Lemma 4 Let the plant G and the normal supervisor V be given. Suppose APdmg 6=
∅. Then, L(VAsup/G) = L(V/G)∪⋃(s,σ)∈APdmg En(s,σ).
Proof. It is clear that L(V/G)⊆ L(VAsup/G), since Asup is enabling. We need to show
L(VAsup/G)−L(V/G) =⋃(s,σ)∈APdmg En(s,σ).
Let s′′ be any string in L(VAsup/G)−L(V/G). It is clear that s′′= s′σ for some s′ ∈
L(V/G)∩L(VAsup/G) and σ ∈Σc,A; moreover, σ /∈V (Po(s′)) and σ ∈Asup(PˆVo,A(Po(s′)))⊆
VAsup(Po(s′)). Thus, we have V (Po(s′)) 6=VAsup(Po(s′)) and σ ∈VAsup(Po(s′))−V (Po(s′)).
Now, from the definition of Asup, we can conclude that σ ∈ I(PˆVo,A(Po(s′))) 6=∅. Then,
there exists some s ∈ L(V/G) such that PˆVo,A(Po(s′)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s)) and (s,σ) ∈ Ldmg.
It is clear that s′σ ∈ En(s,σ), by the definition of En(s,σ). Then, we have s′′ = s′σ ∈
En(s,σ)⊆⋃(s,σ)∈APdmg En(s,σ).
Let s′′ ∈ ⋃(s,σ)∈APdmg En(s,σ). Then, there exists some (s,σ) ∈ APdmg such that
s′′ ∈ En(s,σ) ⊆ Ldmg. Then, we have that s′′ = s′σ for some s′ ∈ L(V/G) such that
PˆVo,A(Po(s
′)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s)), from the definition of En(s,σ). Since (s,σ) ∈ APdmg, by
the definition of Asup, we have σ ∈ I(PˆVo,A(Po(s′)))⊆Asup(PˆVo,A(Po(s′)))⊆VAsup(Po(s′)).
Thus, we have s′′= s′σ ∈L(VAsup/G)−L(V/G). Then,⋃(s,σ)∈APdmg En(s,σ)⊆L(VAsup/G)−
L(V/G).
From Proposition 1 and Lemma 4, we know that Asup generates the largest possi-
ble attacked closed-behavior among the set of successful enabling attackers; for this
reason, we refer to Asup as the supremal successful enabling attacker14. We now show
that the attacked closed-behavior under Asup is the largest possible, even if we take
into consideration those attackers that are not enabling. In other words, there is no
loss of permissiveness when we focus on the class of enabling attackers.
Proposition 2 Let the plant G and the normal supervisor V be given. Suppose APdmg 6=
∅. Then, for any successful attacker A on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg, it holds
that L(VA/G)⊆ L(VAsup/G).
Proof. Let A be any successful attacker on (G,V ) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg, we have
∅ 6= L(VA/G)−L(V/G)⊆ Ldmg. By Lemma 4, we only need to show that L(VA/G)⊆
L(V/G)∪⋃(s,σ)∈APdmg En(s,σ).
Let s′′ be any string in L(VA/G). If s′′ ∈L(V/G), then s′′ ∈L(V/G)∪⋃(s,σ)∈APdmg En(s,σ).
If s′′ /∈ L(V/G), then we have s′′ ∈ L(VA/G)−L(V/G)⊆ Ldmg; we only need to show
that s′′ ∈ ⋃(s,σ)∈APdmg En(s,σ). It is clear that s′′ = sσ ∈ Ldmg for some s ∈ L(V/G)
and some σ ∈ Σc,A. From the proof of Theorem 1, we know that (s,σ) is an attack
pair. Then, it follows that s′′ = sσ ∈ En(s,σ)⊆⋃(s,σ)∈APdmg En(s,σ).
14 However, there could be different attackers that also realize L(VAsup/G).
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4.2 Synthesis of the Supremal Successful Attacker
In this subsection, we shall address the problem of synthesis of the supremal success-
ful attacker Asup under the normality assumption.
Recall that G = (Q,Σ ,δ ,q0) is the plant, V is the supervisor on G w.r.t. (Σc,Σo),
which is given by the finite state automaton S = (X ,Σ ,ζ ,x0), and Ldmg is the set of
damaging strings, which is a regular language over Σ . Let Ldmg be recognized by the
damage automaton H = (Z,Σ ,η ,z0,Zm), i.e., Lm(H) = Ldmg15. We require H to be a
complete finite state automaton, i.e., L(H) = Σ ∗. We shall now provide a high-level
idea of the synthesis algorithm using G, S and H.
In order to synthesize the supremal successful attacker Asup on (G,S) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A)
and Ldmg, which is given in Section 4.1, we need to know the attacker’s observation
sequence PˆVo,A(Po(s)) after the plant executes a string s ∈ L(S‖G) and also record the
set of all the strings s′ ∈ L(S‖G) that are observationally equivalent to s from the at-
tacker’s point of view, i.e., PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′)); then, to determine whether an
attack on the attackable event σ ∈ Σc,A can be successfully established upon observ-
ing PˆVo,A(Po(s)), this set of strings s
′ needs to be compared with the set Lm(H) = Ldmg
by considering all the possible σ -extensions s′σ ∈ L(G) of s′ in G.
To compute the attacker’s observation sequence PˆVo,A(Po(s)), we need to annotate
the supervisor’s observation sequence Po(s) ∈ Po(L(S‖G)) with the sequence of con-
trol commands issued by the supervisor. Now, the basic idea is to first annotate all the
string executions in Po(S) and then transfer the annotation to S‖G. With a dedicated
product operation, one can obtain a transducer structure that maps string executions
in L(S‖G) to attacker’s observation sequences, that is, a finite state structure encod-
ing the PˆVo,A ◦Po function. Since the attacker observes nothing when an unobservable
event to the supervisor is executed, epsilon label can occur in the attacker’s observa-
tion annotation16 in the transducer structure for PˆVo,A ◦Po. We need to determinize the
transducer structure with respect to the attacker’s observation alphabet; it involves a
subset construction w.r.t. the attacker’s observation alphabet. After the determization
operation, we can compute the set of all the strings in L(S‖G) that give rise to the
same attacker’s observation sequence. However, this is not yet sufficient. To deter-
mine whether the attacker can establish a successful attack, we need to incorporate
H in the synchronization to obtain a refined transducer-like structure, before the de-
terminization is carried out. The synchronization is performed up to those strings in
L(S‖G) and those strings in L(G) that are one-step σ -extensions of strings in L(S‖G),
for each σ ∈ Σc,A.
The synthesis algorithm for the supremal successful attackers consists of the fol-
lowing three steps:
1. compute an annotated supervisor
2. compute the generalized synchronous product of the plant, annotated supervisor
and the damage automaton
15 Lm(H) := {s ∈ L(H) | η(z0,s) ∈ Zm} is the marked behavior of H.
16 The attacker’s observation annotation consists of ε label and those labels from the attacker’s observa-
tion alphabet (Σo,A ∪{ε})×Γ ; those events in Σuo are mapped to the ε label, while the events in Σo are
mapped to the labels in (Σo,A ∪{ε})×Γ .
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3. perform a subset construction on the generalized synchronous product w.r.t. the
attacker’s observation alphabet
For example, let us consider the plant G′ shown in the left of Fig. 3 and the supervisor
S′ shown in the right of Fig. 3. We have Σ = {a,a′,b,c,d,d′}, Σo = {a,a′,c,d,d′},
Σc = Σo, Σc,A = {d,d′} and Σo,A = {c,d,d′}. The colored state, i.e., the state 4, in
the plant is the unique bad state to avoid. It is not difficult to verify that S′ is indeed
a supervisor on G′ w.r.t. (Σc,Σo) and the state avoidance property has been enforced,
that is, in the synchronous product of G′ and S′, every state (q,x) ∈ Q×X , where q
is the state 4, can never be reached. We shall illustrate the three steps of the synthesis
algorithm using this example of G′ and S′ in the rest of this section.
Fig. 3: The plant G′ and the supervisor S′
4.2.1 Annotation of the Supervisor
Given the supervisor S = (X ,Σ ,ζ ,x0), we produce the annotated supervisor
SA = (X ,Σo×Γ ∪Σuo,ζA,x0),
where ζA : X×(Σo×Γ ∪Σuo)−→X is the partial transition function, which is defined
as follows:
1. For any x,x′ ∈ X , σ ∈ Σo, γ ∈ Γ , ζA(x,(σ ,γ)) = x′ iff ζ (x,σ) = x′ and γ = {σ ∈
Σ | ζ (x′,σ)!}.
2. For any x,x′ ∈ X , σ ∈ Σuo, ζA(x,σ) = x′ iff ζ (x,σ) = x′.
That is, we annotate each observable transition (x,σ ,x′) in ζ with the control com-
mand γ issued by the supervisor at state x′; that is, (x,σ ,x′) is replaced by (x,(σ ,γ),x′)
in ζA. Thus, if we project out the unobservable events in Σuo, each string in SA will
be of the form (σ1,γ1)(σ2,γ2) . . .(σn,γn) ∈ (Σo×Γ )∗. From the construction of SA,
we have V (σ1σ2 . . .σi) = {σ ∈ Σ | ζ (ζ (x0,s′),σ)!,s′ ∈ L(S)∩P−1o (σ1σ2 . . .σi)}= γi
for each 1≤ i≤ n. Thus, if we project out the unobservable events in Σuo, each string
in SA is of the form
(σ1,V (σ1))(σ2,V (σ1σ2)) . . .(σn,V (σ1σ2 . . .σn)) ∈ (Σo×Γ )∗,
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where σ1σ2 . . .σn is the supervisor’s observation sequence. It is then straightforward
to record all the attacker’s observation sequences
(Po,A(σ1),V (σ1))(Po,A(σ2),V (σ1σ2)) . . .(Po,A(σn),V (σ1σ2 . . .σn)) ∈
((Σo,A∪{ε})×Γ )∗
in SA afterwards, which will be delayed until the annotation in Po(SA) is transferred
to S‖G via a dedicated synchronous product operation.
For example, the annotated supervisor S′A of S′ in Fig. 3 is shown in Fig. 4. If the
plant generates s = ba′c, then Po(s) = a′c is the supervisor’s observation sequence. It
is clear that the attacker’s observation sequence is (ε,{b,c})(c,{b,a}). However, we
only record the sequence b(a′,{b,c})(c,{b,a}) in S′A or, equivalently, we record the
sequence (a′,{b,c})(c,{b,a}) in P(S′A).
Fig. 4: The annotated supervisor S′A
We need to transfer the annotation in P(SA) to S‖G to obtain a transducer struc-
ture that maps string executions in L(S‖G) to attacker’s observation sequences. This
is not that difficult as we only need to synchronize the plant G and the annotated su-
pervisor SA using a dedicated synchronous product operation, which transfers the at-
tacker’s observation annotation, which then encodes the function PˆVo,A◦Po : L(S‖G)→
((Σo,A∪{ε})×Γ )∗. Based on the product of G and SA, we can compute every set of
strings in L(S‖G) that can be mapped to the same attacker’s observation sequence, via
a subset construction w.r.t. the attacker’s observation alphabet. To determine whether
an attack shall be established for an attacker’s observation sequence, we need to syn-
chronize G and SA with H before the determinization is performed. The overall prod-
uct operation will be referred to as the generalized synchronous product operation,
which is explained in detail in the next subsection.
4.2.2 Generalized Synchronous Product
Given the plant G=(Q,Σ ,δ ,q0), the annotated supervisor SA =(X ,Σo×Γ ∪Σuo,ζA,x0)
and the damage automaton H = (Z,Σ ,η ,z0,Zm), the generalized synchronous prod-
uct GP(G,SA,H) of G, SA and H is given by
(Q×X×Z∪{⊥,>},ΣGP,δGP,(q0,x0,z0)),
where ⊥,> are two new states that are different from the states in Q×X×Z, ΣGP =
Σo× ((Σo,A∪{ε})×Γ )∪Σuo×{ε}∪Σc,A and the partial transition function
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δGP : (Q×X×Z∪{⊥,>})×ΣGP −→ Q×X×Z∪{⊥,>}
is defined as follows:
1. For any q,q′ ∈Q, x,x′ ∈ X , z,z′ ∈ Z, γ ∈ Γ , σ ∈ Σo,A, δGP((q,x,z),(σ ,(σ ,γ))) =
(q′,x′,z′) iff δ (q,σ) = q′, ζA(x,(σ ,γ)) = x′ and η(z,σ) = z′.
2. For any q,q′ ∈Q, x,x′ ∈X , z,z′ ∈Z, γ ∈Γ , σ ∈Σo−Σo,A, δGP((q,x,z),(σ ,(ε,γ)))=
(q′,x′,z′) iff δ (q,σ) = q′, ζA(x,(σ ,γ)) = x′ and η(z,σ) = z′.
3. For any q,q′ ∈Q, x,x′ ∈ X , z,z′ ∈ Z, σ ∈ Σuo, δGP((q,x,z),(σ ,ε)) = (q′,x′,z′) iff
δ (q,σ) = q′, ζA(x,σ) = x′ and η(z,σ) = z′.
4. For any q∈Q, x∈X , z∈ Z, σ ∈ Σc,A, δGP((q,x,z),σ) => iff δ (q,σ)!, ¬ζ (x,σ)!
and η(z,σ) ∈ Zm.
5. For any q∈Q, x∈X , z∈ Z, σ ∈ Σc,A, δGP((q,x,z),σ) =⊥ iff δ (q,σ)!, ¬ζ (x,σ)!
and η(z,σ) /∈ Zm.
The definition of GP(G,SA,H) looks complicated. We shall analyze each item care-
fully. The state space is Q×X×Z∪{⊥,>}. Intuitively, the state ⊥ indicates a failed
attack, while the state > indicates a successful attack. The alphabet ΣGP is the union
of
Σo× ((Σo,A∪{ε})×Γ ), Σuo×{ε} and Σc,A.
For each element in Σo×((Σo,A∪{ε})×Γ ) and Σuo×{ε}, the first component σ ∈ Σ
is used to denote an event executed by the plant and the second component l is used
to denote the corresponding observation (annotation) by the attacker. In particular, if
σ ∈ Σo,A ⊆ Σo is executed by the plant, then the attacker’s observation is l = (σ ,γ) ∈
Σo,A×Γ for some γ ∈ Γ ; the attacker’s observation is l = (ε,γ) ∈ {ε}×Γ for some
γ ∈ Γ if σ ∈ Σo−Σo,A is executed by the plant. If σ ∈ Σuo is executed by the plant,
then the attacker observes nothing and we use the l = ε label for the annotation.
By the items 1)-3) of the definition of δGP, we can observe that every string s ∈
L(S‖G) is the projection of some string of L(GP(G,SA,H)) onto the first component.
Moreover, for any string of the form s=(σ1, l1)(σ2, l2) . . .(σn, ln) in L(GP(G,SA,H)),
we have that l1l2 . . . ln = PˆVo,A(Po(σ1σ2 . . .σn)). That is, the items 1)-3) of the defini-
tion of δGP ensures that part of GP(G,SA,H) encodes the transducer structure that
maps string executions in L(S‖G) to attacker’s observation sequences. By the items
4)-5) of the definition of δGP, we observe that, when projected onto the first compo-
nent, L(GP(G,SA,H)) can generate strings in L(G)−L(S‖G), but these strings can
only be some one-step σ -extensions of strings in L(S‖G) for σ ∈ Σc,A; in particular,
these strings occur precisely because of the actuator attack on attackable events. After
the actuator attack, the closed-loop system will be halted and thus we will not need to
record the attacker’s observation any more. It is for this reason that Σc,A is included
in ΣGP. GP(G,SA,H) transduces strings in L(S‖G) and, when projected onto the first
component, record the strings in L(S‖G)Σc,A∩L(G)−L(S‖G). Thus, for each string s
of the form (σ1, l1)(σ2, l2) . . .(σn, ln)σn+1 generated by GP(G,SA,H), where σn+1 ∈
Σc,A, we have that σ1σ2 . . .σn+1 ∈ Ldmg if δGP((q0,x0,z0),s) => and σ1σ2 . . .σn+1 /∈
Ldmg if δGP((q0,x0,z0),s) =⊥; in both cases, we have σ1σ2 . . .σn+1 ∈ L(S‖G)Σc,A∩
L(G)−L(S‖G).
For example, consider the damage automaton H ′ shown in Fig. 5, where we have
omitted the dump state, i.e., state 6, and the corresponding transitions. The general-
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Fig. 5: The damage automaton H ′, where the dump state is not explicitly shown
ized synchronous product GP(G′,S′A,H ′) of G′, S′A and H ′ is then shown in Fig. 6.
The set of damaging strings is L′dmg = {a′d′,ba′d}.
Fig. 6: The generalized synchronous product GP(G′,S′A,H ′)
4.2.3 Subset Construction w.r.t. the Attacker’s Observation Alphabet
The generalized synchronous product GP(G,SA,H) is a transducer-like structure that
maps string executions in L(S‖G) to attacker’s observation sequences; furthermore,
it records in all the cases when an actuator attack occurs and also determines whether
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it will succeed. To determine whether a successful actuator attack can be established,
we need to determine each set17 of string executions in L(S‖G) that are mapped to the
same attackers’ observation sequence. This is what will be carried out in this subsec-
tion, which involves a subset construction w.r.t. the attacker’s observation alphabet.
Subset Construction w.r.t. the Attacker’s Observation Alphabet:
Given GP(G,SA,H), we shall now perform subset construction on GP(G,SA,H)
with respect to the attacker’s observation alphabet.
Let GPS(G,SA,H) denote the sub-automaton of GP(G,SA,H) with state space re-
stricted to Q×X×Z. The alphabet of GPS(G,SA,H) is ΣGPS = Σo× ((Σo,A∪{ε})×
Γ )∪Σuo×{ε} and it is clear that the partial transition function δGPS : (Q×X×Z)×
ΣGPS 7→ Q×X×Z of GPS(G,SA,H) is defined as follows:
1. For any q,q′ ∈Q, x,x′ ∈ X , z,z′ ∈ Z, γ ∈Γ , σ ∈ Σo,A, δGPS((q,x,z),(σ ,(σ ,γ))) =
(q′,x′,z′) iff δ (q,σ) = q′, ζA(x,(σ ,γ)) = x′ and η(z,σ) = z′.
2. For any q,q′ ∈Q, x,x′ ∈X , z,z′ ∈Z, γ ∈Γ , σ ∈Σo−Σo,A, δGPS((q,x,z),(σ ,(ε,γ)))=
(q′,x′,z′) iff δ (q,σ) = q′, ζA(x,(σ ,γ)) = x′ and η(z,σ) = z′.
3. For any q,q′ ∈ Q, x,x′ ∈ X , z,z′ ∈ Z, σ ∈ Σuo, δGPS((q,x,z),(σ ,ε)) = (q′,x′,z′)
iff δ (q,σ) = q′, ζA(x,σ) = x′ and η(z,σ) = z′.
Let GPS1(G,SA,H) (respectively, GPS2(G,SA,H)) denote the automaton that is ob-
tained from GPS(G,SA,H) by removing18 the second component l (respectively, first
component σ ) from the event (σ , l) for each transition. Let SUB(GPS2(G,SA,H)) de-
note the automaton that is obtained from GPS2(G,SA,H) by subset construction [12].
It follows that SUB(GPS2(G,SA,H))= (Y,Σ SUB,∆ SUB,y0), where Y = 2Q×X×Z , y0 =
δGPS((q0,x0,z0),(Σuo×{ε})∗)∈Y , Σ SUB =(Σo,A∪{ε})×Γ , ∆ SUB :Y×Σ SUB−→Y
is the transition function defined as follows: for any y ∈ Y , l ∈ Σ SUB, ∆ SUB(y, l) :=
δGPS(δGPS(y,Σo×{l}),(Σuo×{ε})∗)
Let SUB(GP(G,SA,H)) := (SUB(GPS2(G,SA,H)),L f ), where L f : Y 7→ 2Σc,A is a
labeling function defined as follows: for any y ∈ Y and any σ ∈ Σc,A, σ ∈ L f (y) iff
there exists some v ∈ y such that,
1. δGP(v,σ) =>, and
2. for any v′ ∈ y, δGP(v′,σ)! implies δGP(v′,σ) =>.
Intuitively, SUB(GP(G,SA,H)) is a Moore automaton that maps each attacker’s
observation sequence to the subset of attackable events that are attacked19 by Asup. In
particular, after the attacker observes the sequence l1l2 . . . ln ∈ ((Σo,A∪{ε})×Γ )∗ =
(Σ SUB)∗, the subset of attackable events that are attacked by Asup is L f (∆ SUB(y0, l1l2 . . . ln)).
If L f (∆ SUB(y0, l1l2 . . . ln)) =∅, then the attacker cannot establish an attack after ob-
serving l1l2 . . . ln. If this holds for all the possible attacker’s observation sequences
in PˆVo,A(Po(L(S‖G))), then we conclude that (G,S) is not attackable w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A)
and Ldmg.
17 By incorporating H in the generalized synchronous product, we do not even need to explicitly con-
struct this set: we can directly compare this set of strings with the set Lm(H) = Ldmg by considering all the
possible σ -extensions of these strings in G with subset construction.
18 In general, GPS2(G,SA,H) is an ε-nondeterministic finite automaton [12].
19 An attackable event is attacked by Asup if it is disabled by the supervisor and is enabled by Asup.
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4.2.4 Proof of Correctness
In this subsection, we shall show that the supremal successful attacker Asup : PˆVo,A(Po(L(S‖G))) 7→
∆Γ is realized20 by the Moore automaton SUB(GP(G,SA,H)), if (G,S) is attackable
w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg. If (G,S) is not attackable w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg, then
we can also directly read this information off SUB(GP(G,SA,H)).
The next lemma shows that the domain of Asup is indeed captured by SUB(GP(G,SA,H)).
The closed-behavior L(SUB(GP(G,SA,H))) of the Moore automaton SUB(GP(G,SA,H))=
(SUB(GPS2(G,SA,H)),L f ) is defined to be L(SUB(GPS2(G,SA,H)))21.
Lemma 5 L(SUB(GP(G,SA,H))) = PˆVo,A(Po(L(S‖G))).
Proof. It is clear that L(SUB(GPS2(G,SA,H))) = L(GPS2(G,SA,H))22, since subset
construction preserves the closed-behavior of an ε-NFA. Recall that GPS2(G,SA,H)
denotes the ε-NFA that is obtained from GPS(G,SA,H) by removing the first compo-
nent σ from the event (σ , l) for each transition. By the construction of GPS(G,SA,H),
L(GPS(G,SA,H)) consists of strings of the form s = (σ1, l1)(σ2, l2) . . .(σn, ln), where
l1l2 . . . ln = PˆVo,A(Po(σ1σ2 . . .σn)) and σ1σ2 . . .σn ∈ L(S‖G); moreover, every string s
in L(S‖G) is the projection of some string in L(GPS(G,SA,H)) onto the first com-
ponent, by the construction of GPS(G,SA,H). Thus, we have L(GPS1(G,SA,H)) =
L(S‖G) and L(GPS2(G,SA,H))= PˆVo,A(Po(L(S‖G))). Thus, L(SUB(GP(G,SA,H)))=
PˆVo,A(Po(L(S‖G))).
Proposition 3 APdmg 6= ∅ iff there exists a reachable state y of SUB(GP(G,SA,H))
with L f (y) 6=∅.
Proof. Suppose there exists a reachable state y in SUB(GP(G,SA,H)) with L f (y) 6=
∅. Let σ ∈ L f (y). By the definition, σ ∈ Σc,A and there exists some v ∈ y such that,
1) δGP(v,σ) = > and 2) for any v′ ∈ y, δGP(v′,σ)! implies δGP(v′,σ) = >. Then,
by the construction of GPS1(G,SA,H) and SUB(GPS2(G,SA,H)), there exists some
string s ∈ L(S‖G) such that
1. δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s) = v, and
2. for any v′ ∈ y, there exists some string s′ ∈L(S‖G) such that δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′)=
v′ and PˆVo,A(Po(s))= Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′)); moreover, for any s′ ∈L(S‖G) such that PˆVo,A(Po(s))=
PˆVo,A(Po(s
′)), we have δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′) ∈ y.
Here, δGPS1 denotes the partial transition function of GPS1(G,SA,H). We shall now
show that (s,σ) is an attack pair for (G,S) w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg. It then follows
that APdmg 6=∅.
Indeed, sσ ∈ Ldmg since δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s) = v and δGP(v,σ) =>. For any s′ ∈
L(S‖G) such that PˆVo,A(Po(s))= PˆVo,A(Po(s′)) and s′σ ∈L(G), we have δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′)∈
20 A formal interpretation will be provided soon.
21 That is, the labeling function is ignored in the definition of the closed-behavior of an Moore automa-
ton.
22 The definition of the closed-behavior of an ε-nondeterministic finite automaton (ε-NFA) is similar to
that of a deterministic finite automaton [12].
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y, s′σ ∈ L(G) and s′σ /∈ L(S‖G), since sσ /∈ L(S‖G) and V (Po(s)) =V (Po(s′)). Thus,
we conclude that δGP(δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′),σ)! and thus δGP(δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′),σ)=
>. We then conclude that s′σ ∈ Ldmg and then (s,σ) is an attack pair for (G,S) w.r.t.
(Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg.
Suppose there exists an attack pair (s,σ)∈ APdmg. Then, by definition, sσ ∈ Ldmg
and, for any s′ ∈ L(S‖G), PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = PˆVo,A(Po(s′)) and s′σ ∈ L(G) together implies
s′σ ∈ Ldmg. It is clear that ∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s)))! since δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s)!. We now
show that σ ∈L f (∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s)))). It then follows that L f (∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s)))) 6=
∅ and ∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s))) is a reachable state of SUB(GP(G,SA,H)).
First of all, we have σ ∈ Σc,A by the definition of an attack pair. It is clear that
δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s) ∈ ∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s))). We only need to show the following:
1. δGP(δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s),σ) =>, and
2. for any v′ ∈ ∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s))), δGP(v′,σ)! implies δGP(v′,σ) =>.
Then, it follows that σ ∈ L f (∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s)))).
The first item is straightforward from sσ ∈ Ldmg. In the rest, we prove the second
item.
Let v′ ∈ ∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s))). It follows that there exists some string s′ ∈ L(S‖G)
such that δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′) = v′ and PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′)). Now, we suppose
δGP(v′,σ)!, then we have s′σ ∈ L(G). That is, we have s′ ∈ L(S‖G), PˆVo,A(Po(s)) =
PˆVo,A(Po(s
′)) and s′σ ∈ L(G). Thus, we can then conclude that s′σ ∈ Ldmg. That is, we
have δGP(δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′),σ) =>, i.e., δGP(v′,σ) =>.
Based on Proposition 3, we immediately have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (G,S) is attackable with respect to (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg iff there exists
a reachable state y in SUB(GP(G,SA,H)) with L f (y) 6=∅.
Furthermore, if (G,S) is attackable w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg, then Asup : PˆVo,A(Po(L(S‖G))) 7→
∆Γ is realized by SUB(GP(G,SA,H)) in the following sense.
Theorem 3 Suppose APdmg 6= ∅. Then, I(PˆVo,A(Po(s))) = L f (∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s))))
for any s ∈ L(S‖G).
Remark 4 Recall that Asup(PˆVo,A(Po(s))) = (V (Po(s))∩Σc,A)∪ I(PˆVo,A(Po(s))), for any
s∈L(S‖G), where I(PˆVo,A(Po(s))) := {σ ∈Σc,A | ∃s′ ∈L(S‖G), PˆVo,A(Po(s))= PˆVo,A(Po(s′))∧
(s′,σ) ∈ APdmg}. It is not difficult to see that I(PˆVo,A(Po(s))) is indeed the set of at-
tackable events that are attacked by Asup after observing the attacker’s observation
sequence PˆVo,A(Po(s)). Thus, this theorem states that, after the sequence Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s)) is
observed, the subset of attackable events that are attacked by Asup is L f (∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s)))).
Proof. Let σ ∈ I(PˆVo,A(Po(s))). Then, by the definition, there exists some s′ ∈ L(S‖G)
such that PˆVo,A(Po(s)) = Pˆ
V
o,A(Po(s
′)) and (s′,σ) ∈ APdmg. From the proof of Proposi-
tion 3, we conclude that σ ∈L f (∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s′))))=L f (∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s)))).
Let σ ∈ L f (∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s)))). By the definition, σ ∈ Σc,A and there exists
some s′ ∈ L(S‖G) such that
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1. PˆVo,A(Po(s
′)))) = PˆVo,A(Po(s)))), δ
GPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′) ∈ ∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s))) and
δGP(δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′),σ) =>
2. for any s′′ ∈L(S‖G) such that PˆVo,A(Po(s′′))))= PˆVo,A(Po(s)))), we have δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′′)∈
∆ SUB(y0, PˆVo,A(Po(s))), and δ
GP(δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′′),σ)! implies δGP(δGPS1((q0,x0,z0),s′′),σ)=
>
The first item says that s′σ ∈ Ldmg and the second item says that for any s′′ ∈ L(S‖G)
such that PˆVo,A(Po(s
′′)))) = PˆVo,A(Po(s
′)))), s′′σ ∈ L(G) implies s′′σ ∈ Ldmg. Thus, we
conclude that (s′,σ) is an attack pair w.r.t. (Σc,A,Σo,A) and Ldmg. Since s′ ∈ L(S‖G)
and PˆVo,A(Po(s
′)))) = PˆVo,A(Po(s)))), we conclude that σ ∈ I(PˆVo,A(Po(s))).
For example, the Moore automaton SUB(GP(G′,S′A,H ′)) is shown in Fig. 7 for
the G′, S′ and H ′ given previously. In particular, we can conclude that (G′,S′) is
attackable with respect to (Σc,A,Σo,A) and L′dmg, since
L f ({(3,3,3),(2,3,4)}) 6=∅.
The supremal successful attacker A′sup performs attack after observing l = (ε,{b,c})
(the attacker can conclude that string s = a′ or s = ba′ has been generated), and the
attacker enables attackable events d,d′ and leads to successful attack (I(ε,{b,c}) =
{d,d′}).
Fig. 7: A Moore automaton representation of the supremal successful enabling
attacker Asup
5 Discussions and Conclusions
In this work, we have formulated the following two synthesis problems within discrete-
event systems formalism.
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1. the problem of synthesis of successful actuator attackers on supervisors.
2. the problem of synthesis of resilient supervisors against actuator attackers.
Moreover, we have resolved the problem of synthesis of successful actuator attackers
on normal supervisors under the assumption Σc,A ⊆ Σo,A, i.e., a normality assumption
on the attacker, in which case the supremal successful actuator attackers exist and can
be synthesized based on the synthesis algorithm provided in Section 4.2.
This research work imposes some reasonable assumptions (see Remark 2) in or-
der for the exposition to remain elementary. In the following, we shall briefly discuss
about some future research directions that could be continued based on this work.
First of all, the supremal actuator attackers synthesized in this work are consid-
ered to be passive. They are passive since they would never disable attackable events
that are enabled by the supervisors (i.e., they are enabling). A passive attacker never
alters the execution of the closed-loop system within L(V/G), and it only patiently
waits for its chance in order to establish a successful attack; on the other hand, an
active attacker will influence the execution of the closed-loop system within L(V/G),
by properly disabling attackable events that are enabled by the supervisors, so that
there is a higher chance for it to establish a successful attack in any single run. From
this point of view, the attack goal
1. L(VA/G)∩Ldmg 6=∅
2. L(VA/G)−P−1o Po(L(V/G))⊆ LdmgΣ ∗.
is to some extent actually a weak attack goal, and then the attackability formulated in
this paper corresponds to weak attackability. It is of interest to impose other condi-
tions so that the synthesized supervisors can achieve strong attack goals and we need
to formulate a notion of strong attackability correspondingly23. Intuitively, in strong
attack, the attacker may disable attackable events that are enabled by the supervisors
for two different purposes: 1) increase the chance that the attack will be successful,
2) increase the chances that the closed-loop system will execute a vulnerable string24
that can be attacked.
Secondly, we assume that the attackers will not take risks in attacking the super-
visors. This greatly limits the attack capability of the attackers. In many scenarios,
it is useful to consider the synthesis of risky attackers. An example of a risky attack
is to attack an attackable event when the attacker knows it is possible but is unsure
whether a damaging string will be generated or not.
Thirdly, we impose in this work the assumption Σc,A ⊆ Σo,A and only consider the
case of attacking normal supervisors. It is of interest to relax these two assumptions
and study under what circumstances can supremal successful attackers be synthesized
in general.
Finally, the main purpose for studying the synthesis of successful attackers is to
synthesize resilient supervisor against actuator attackers. Thus, it is crucial to address
the problem of synthesis of resilient supervisors, which is also left as a future work.
It is also of interest to relax assumption that the set Σo,A of events observable to
the attacker is a subset of the set Σo of observable events for the supervisor. It is also
23 Alternatively, we may refer to weak attack as passive attack and strong attack as active attack.
24 a string s ∈ L(V/G) is said to be vulnerable if there exists some σ ∈ Σc,A such that (s,σ) ∈ APdmg.
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of interest to consider attack architectures with distributed or hierarchical architec-
tures [10].
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